Southeast Asia is quietly entering a nuclear age. Driven by rising electricity demand, net‑zero commitments and concerns over fossil‑fuel volatility, more than half of Asean members are now revisiting nuclear power. Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines are moving fastest, targeting operational reactors in the early 2030s. Malaysia and Thailand are exploring longer horizons, while others signal interest without timelines.
This renewed momentum is shaped by global shifts: the rise of small modular reactors (SMRs), nuclear energy’s inclusion in green taxonomies, the World Bank’s openness to nuclear financing, and geopolitical disruptions to fossil‑fuel supply chains. But nuclear energy is not just a technical or climate decision. It is a long‑term geopolitical commitment that will shape Southeast Asia’s strategic landscape for decades.
A nuclear market defined by geopolitics
The global civil nuclear market is characterised as oligopolistic. Civil nuclear technology is not interoperable. A country operating an American reactor cannot load Russian fuel; a Chinese SMR cannot be regulated under US standards. Once a country chooses a supplier, it effectively adopts a 60‑year “geopolitical package” involving fuel cycles, safety frameworks, financing terms and strategic alignment.
Three major suppliers dominate Southeast Asia’s options: Russia, the US and its allies Japan and South Korea, and China.
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As nuclear energy shifts from “if” to “how”, Southeast Asian leaders must recognise that nuclear development is a strategic choice with long-term geopolitical consequences. The region’s traditional hedging strategy cannot be applied to nuclear procurement.
Russia: turnkey convenience, strategic dependence
Russia’s state-owned Rosatom is the world’s most aggressive exporter of nuclear power plants. Its Build‑Own‑Operate (BOO) model is attractive for newcomer states: Russia handles construction, operation and even waste management. For governments with limited budgets or technical capacity, this is the easiest path to nuclearisation.
But the geopolitical cost is high. BOO locks countries into long-term dependence on Russian fuel, technology and regulatory support. In an era of sanctions and geopolitical fragmentation, this dependence could expose critical energy infrastructure to external shocks.
United States, Japan, South Korea: high standards, strict controls
The US and its Asian partners offer advanced SMR technology and strong safety credentials. But access comes with legal constraints. Countries must sign a “123 Agreement”, which prohibits uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. This ensures non‑proliferation but limits national autonomy over the fuel cycle.
The US package is technologically attractive but politically demanding; recipient states must align their nuclear governance with US regulatory frameworks.
China: fast, cheap, and strategically embedded
China is promoting its Hualong One reactor and Linglong One SMR through state-owned firms China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). Its offer includes rapid construction, competitive pricing and flexible financing from policy banks.
But China rarely treats nuclear projects as standalone deals. They are bundled into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), alongside power grids, industrial parks and digital infrastructure. For Southeast Asian states with South China Sea disputes, relying on Chinese nuclear technology carries strategic risks that extend beyond energy.
Why hedging won’t work
Asean states have long relied on hedging strategy—balancing relations with major powers through diversified trade, investment and defence cooperation. It is common for a country to buy Russian fighter jets, host US military exercises and welcome Chinese investment simultaneously.
Nuclear energy breaks this pattern.
Because reactor systems are non‑interoperable, nuclear procurement is a monogamous choice. A country cannot hedge by mixing suppliers or switching frameworks mid‑way. Nuclear infrastructure is deeply embedded in national security, regulatory systems and energy planning. Once a supplier is chosen, strategic alignment follows.
This means Southeast Asian countries must confront a reality they have long avoided: nuclear energy forces them to pick sides.
Can ASEANTOM reduce the risks?
ASEANTOM, established in 2013, is Asean’s network of nuclear regulatory bodies. It aims to harmonise safety standards, strengthen safeguards and coordinate emergency response. While ASEANTOM cannot make Russian fuel compatible with American reactors, it can reduce the geopolitical vulnerabilities that come with bilateral nuclear deals.
A regional regulatory framework can:
- improve bargaining power vis‑à‑vis major suppliers
- prevent predatory financing or restrictive legal terms
- ensure nuclearisation does not undermine the Southeast Asia Nuclear‑Weapon‑Free Zone (SEANWFZ)
- reduce the risk of strategic entrapment
ASEANTOM cannot eliminate technological dependence, but it can help Asean countries avoid being cornered by supplier-driven political leverage.
Navigating the nuclear future
As nuclear energy shifts from “if” to “how”, Southeast Asian leaders must recognise that nuclear development is a strategic choice with long-term geopolitical consequences. The region’s traditional hedging strategy cannot be applied to nuclear procurement.
Countries must navigate trade-offs in aligning with Washington, Moscow or Beijing.
The challenge is not only building reactors safely, but ensuring nuclear energy does not compromise strategic autonomy—something Asean has guarded for decades.
A collective approach through ASEANTOM may be the region’s best chance to prevent nuclear suppliers from shaping Southeast Asia’s geopolitical future more than Southeast Asia shapes its own.
Mahadi Sugiono is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada Indonesia and a campaigner of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), Nobel Prize winner 2017
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
