After being shut out of a German project, Chinese wind power company Mingyang Smart Energy had been looking to the UK as an entry point to European markets, as Dialogue Earth reported in March.
Mingyang was planning to build a US$2 billion wind power factory at a Scottish port, which would have been the UK’s largest such facility.
But the UK government vetoed the project, citing security concerns. The same day, 25 March, Danish firm Vestas announced plans for an over EUR 250 million (US$300 million) factory building nacelles for wind turbines in Scotland, as long as it secures enough UK orders.
Elena Kiryakova, an economist with ODI Global, a think-tank headquartered in London, told Dialogue Earth: “There’s a clear contrast between the two decisions. It’s obvious that the UK needs wind power manufacturing capacity. The question is who is going to provide it.”
According to a paywalled analysis by BloombergNEF, the blocking of Mingyang shrinks possible routes onto the European market for Chinese offshore wind manufacturers and strengthens the position of European firms like Vestas. This could mean higher prices for wind power project developers, the analysis adds.
Chinese companies like Mingyang will need to keep searching for ways into Europe’s attractive but hard-to-access markets.
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If they can’t work in Europe, they’ll shift to emerging markets. These need an energy transition and are sensitive to pricing – and that makes Chinese tech more attractive.
Elena Kiryakova, economist, ODI Global
The politics behind the refusal
Mingyang expressed disappointment at the decision and stressed that it is not state-owned or controlled and has over the last two years developed a solution to address data and cybersecurity concerns. The decision was, the company said, a missed opportunity for the UK to reduce wind power costs and attract investment during a time of tight supply in the global turbine market.
Guo Chao, a senior market analyst with global energy consultancy TGS | 4C, told Dialogue Earth that Mingyang and the UK’s Octopus Energy had responded to the issue of security concerns last year by announcing a joint project on separating generation hardware and data, but that this was clearly not enough to reassure the UK government.
Elena Kiryakova says the government hasn’t provided a clear definition of “national security”, which “makes it hard for outsiders to tell what are genuine security concerns, and what may have an element of protectionism. That lack of clarity can itself make investments less likely.”
The decision was also controversial within the UK. The Scottish National Party complained that Scotland would lose out on US$2 billion in investment and 1,500 new jobs, and that the nation’s transition from oil and gas to renewables would suffer.
The controversy has only added to long-standing differences between the party and the UK government. The Mingyang project had been supported by the Scottish government, and with a Scottish election imminent and energy topics high on the agenda, the Chinese investment only became more sensitive.
Kiryakova says the case reflects the complexity of UK-China cooperation on the climate. “The UK is taking a selective approach to climate cooperation. It remains open to scientific research and policy exchanges, but has strict limits when it comes to actual energy infrastructure.”
This is in line with the importance the UK puts on energy security. With unstable energy prices and an uncertain geopolitical environment, security of supply chains is being given greater priority. “But there’s a fundamental tension there,” she says. “How do you balance a faster transition, costs, and reliance on others?”
UK’s slow deployment of offshore wind
The UK is one of the busiest markets for offshore wind. As of February 2025, the country had 30.7 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind installed or committed, with another 7.2 GW consented. The government aims to have 43 to 50 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030.
The industry, however, is unsure about reaching the higher end of that range. UK-based Energy Industries Council predicts that bottlenecks in port capacity, installation vessel availability and supply chain constraints will mean actually delivered capacity by 2030 will be nearer 43 GW.
Guo Chao says that while the UK has sped up offshore wind tendering in response to the energy security pressures arising from the Iran war, actual project delivery is slow: “Even if a project is consented, there are issues with grid connections and construction delays. Meeting the 2030 target will be tough.”
Order books and policy support mean plans for a Vestas factory in the UK are more likely to go ahead, but the additional capacity provided will be limited. The company says the facility will employ 500 people, only a third as many as the planned Mingyang project was slated to.
According to BloombergNEF’s paywalled analysis, the planned factory would start operating around 2029 and could reach full capacity in 2030, producing 1.5 GW of generation capacity a year. That will be only just enough to avoid supply shortages for offshore wind projects in Europe, the analysis added.
Elena Kiryakova said delays in project approvals, skills shortages and issues with the auction process are all slowing the UK’s deployment of offshore wind. “If those structural issues aren’t resolved, simply adding turbine manufacturing capacity won’t change things,” she warned.
Europe again?
The UK’s rejection of Chinese wind power investment was not unprecedented. In 2025, Mingyang had planned to provide turbines for Germany’s Waterkant wind farm in the North Sea but was replaced by Siemens Gamesa.
According to data from BloombergNEF, as of 2025, 93 per cent of Chinese wind power manufacturing was being sold in China. Almost all overseas growth was coming from onshore wind projects in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia, the data shows. In 2024, China’s three big turbine manufacturers (Goldwind, Mingyang and Windey Energy) accounted for less than 1 per cent of installed capacity in Europe, where the market remains dominated by local firms.
Guo Chao explained that, faced with fierce competition at home, Mingyang had planned to focus on both foreign markets and offshore wind (particularly floating turbines), and when it comes to offshore wind, you can’t ignore the European market.
BloombergNEF’s paywalled analysis shows that the project refusal in the UK doesn’t mean all Mingyang’s offshore wind export options are gone, but those remaining are smaller and of less strategic significance than the huge European market. The report estimates that Europe will add 109 GW of offshore wind capacity between 2026 and 2035, against 33 GW in all other markets excluding mainland China.
But the proposed EU Industrial Accelerator Act aims to increase the share of local manufacturing in EU GDP, and the UK is selecting suppliers based on security concerns. Both are different routes with an identical outcome: higher barriers to foreign investment.
And, Guo Chao said, the problems facing offshore wind farms aren’t just about the supply of equipment. These projects need more long-term maintenance than the onshore equivalents, as well as financial cost, and are more subject to political risks – so Europe’s developers tend to prefer local manufacturers.
Nevertheless, Mingyang is not planning to retreat from European shores. After the Scotland project was blocked, Horatio Evers, CEO of Mingyang’s European subsidiary, said in a statement that the company remained “fully committed to its internationalisation strategy, accelerated investment and industrial localisation plans in the UK and wider European markets.” Mingyang once said it has five European sites in mind as alternatives if the Scotland project were not approved, but it has not made those public.
On 14 April, Spain’s prime minister Pedro Sánchez met with Mingyang’s CEO Zhang Chuanwei and expressed a willingness to support Mingyang’s localised development in Spain and Europe, and to work together to promote offshore wind development on the continent. It remains to be seen if this will involve a Mingyang factory in Spain.
Elena Kiryakova thinks that “the channels to the European market are narrowing” for Chinese companies. But she added that cooperation with European companies could be more practical than setting up local factories or exporting complete turbines. Mingyang already has a track record. In 2024 it signed an agreement with Italian energy firm Renexia to build a turbine factor in Italy.
Guo Chao said Italy, Spain and Poland may be better points of entry to European markets than the UK and Germany. “If Chinese turbine manufacturers can use their core strengths to gather successful project experience in these countries, there’s potential for them to make further inroads into the market later on,” he said.
Elena Kiryakova stressed that shutting Chinese companies out doesn’t mean the end of competition. “If they can’t work in Europe, they’ll shift to emerging markets. These need an energy transition and are sensitive to pricing – and that makes Chinese tech more attractive,” she said.
This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth under a Creative Commons licence.
