Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s landslide election victory has handed her government unprecedented power to reshape the country’s energy transition, potentially accelerating nuclear expansion while tightening the link between climate policy and economic security.
Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party secured about 316 seats in the 465-seat lower house in the 8 February snap election – the first single-party supermajority in the post-war era. The scale of the victory gives her wide latitude to push controversial reforms with limited parliamentary resistance.
The government can now more easily pass budgets, industrial subsidies and regulatory changes central to Japan’s attempt to balance energy security, decarbonisation and economic competitiveness.
Takaichi has consistently framed energy policy as a question of national resilience rather than purely environmental transition.
“The stable and inexpensive supply of energy is absolutely crucial,” she said in an October policy speech. “In particular, domestically-sourced energy, notably nuclear power and perovskite solar cells, will be critical.”
She pledged to use Japan’s Green Transformation funding to maximise deployment of decarbonised energy sources while pushing energy efficiency and fuel switching technologies.
That statement reflects the ideological framing that has defined her platform: decarbonisation must reinforce national industrial strength and reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels, rather than relying on rapid renewable expansion.
Japanese policy debate under her leadership increasingly treats nuclear not as a transitional fuel but as a core long-term pillar. Local media reports indicate she supports accelerating next-generation reactor development and fusion technology while taking a more selective approach toward renewable energy expansion.
If implemented aggressively, that would mark a shift from post-Fukushima caution toward a strategy closer to pre-2011 industrial energy planning, though with climate targets layered on top.
Controlled renewables, domestic tech
Takaichi has not ruled out renewable expansion. However, recent policy discussions suggest a greater focus on managing deployment pace and system integration risks.
Her earlier remarks have pointed to possible reviews of subsidy structures for large-scale solar projects, especially ground-mounted installations. Some proposals have already raised the possibility of scaling back or phasing out support for mega-solar projects, although no final policy decision has been confirmed.
Attention is also shifting toward domestically developed clean technologies such as perovskite solar cells. These lightweight, flexible panels can be installed on building walls, rooftops and urban infrastructure.
For Japan, the technology carries strategic appeal. Production can rely on materials such as iodine, where Japan holds a strong global supply position. This reduces dependence on imported silicon supply chains.
Government officials and industry groups increasingly describe perovskite as a potential next-generation export sector. Many see it as a pathway for Japan to rebuild technological leadership in solar manufacturing.
Industrial strategy over market forces
Japan’s climate commitments remain formally unchanged. The country continues to target deep emissions cuts over coming decades while attempting to align climate policy with broader industrial transformation.
The supermajority, however, increases the likelihood that industrial strategy considerations will play a stronger role in shaping climate policy. Supply chain security and domestic manufacturing capacity are becoming more central to policy discussions, sometimes taking precedence over local political compromises.
Takaichi’s wider economic programme focuses on fiscal expansion, industrial investment and structural reform, and markets broadly expect this policy direction to translate into higher public spending and more active industrial policy.
In the energy sector, this could result in stronger support for low-carbon industrial power and a more targeted, state-guided renewable rollout.
Even with strong parliamentary control, Japan’s energy transition remains constrained by physical and social bottlenecks.
Nuclear restarts face regulatory reviews and local community consent. Renewable projects face grid connection delays and rising construction costs. Energy infrastructure expansion requires long-term capital investment regardless of political mandate.
Takaichi herself has acknowledged the importance of local acceptance, saying energy expansion must proceed with “understanding of local communities” and environmental considerations, a political reality no parliamentary majority can easily override.
A rare window
Following the election victory, Takaichi signalled plans to aggressively push her policy agenda across fiscal, security and economic domains, which is widely viewed as a signal that applies equally to energy and industrial strategy.
Her electoral mandate reduces the risk of internal party resistance, giving her more control over long-term infrastructure spending and decarbonisation investment priorities. With no national election expected for several years, she now has a rare window to lock in structural changes to Japan’s energy system.
The central question is not whether Japan will pursue decarbonisation – that remains government policy – but how it will do so.
The likely outcome is a transition defined by firm low-carbon power, domestic clean-technology manufacturing and heavy state-guided industrial decarbonisation.
Whether that approach accelerates emissions reductions or slows renewable deployment will depend less on parliamentary votes and more on grid reform, permitting changes and market design.
For now, the supermajority signals something rare in Japanese politics: policy continuity. For energy markets, climate investors and utilities, that may prove as important as the policy direction itself.
